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Abstract
Will the population of today’s high-income countries continue to age throughout
the remainder of the century? We answer this question by combining two
methodologies, Bayesian hierarchical probabilistic population forecasting and the
use of prospective ages, which are chronological ages adjusted for changes in life
expectancy. We distinguish two variants of measures of aging: those that depend
on fixed chronological ages and those that use prospective ages. Conventional
measures do not, for example, distinguish between 65-year-olds in 2000 and 65-
year-olds in 2100. In making forecasts of population aging over long periods of time,
ignoring changes in the characteristics of people can lead to misleading results. It is
preferable to use measures based on prospective ages in which expected changes
in life expectancy are taken into account. We present probabilistic forecasts of
population aging that use conventional and prospective measures for high-income
countries as a group. The probabilistic forecasts based on conventional measures
of aging show that the probability that aging will continue throughout the century
is essentially one. In contrast, the probabilistic forecasts based on prospective
measures of population aging show that population aging will almost certainly
come to end well before the end of the century. Using prospective measures of
population aging, we show that aging in high-income countries is likely a transitory
phenomenon.
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2 The end of population aging in high-income countries
1 Introduction
What is the likely future of the population aging trends observed in today’s
high-income and high middle-income countries? Will the populations of these
countries grow older continuously? If the answer is “yes”, then policy-makers
should think about how to adjust to this continuous aging process, perhaps by
adjusting regulations with respect to migration. But if the answer is “no”, then such
adjustments may not be necessary. High-income and high middle-income countries
are home to more than half of the world’s population, and are the places where the
challenges associated with population aging are now the greatest.
The effects of population ageing differ widely by country, as they depend on each
country’s specific demographic history and policy environment. Our focus in this
paper is on providing background information for use in policy discussions, rather
than on proposing policies for specific countries. Here, we investigate whether
the current aging trends in today’s wealthier countries are likely to continue
throughout the century using probabilistic population forecasts (Raftery et al. 2012),
and examine new measures of population aging that are adjusted for changes in
life expectancy (Sanderson and Scherbov 2017, 2013, 2010; Lutz, Sanderson and
Scherbov 2008). Our data come from UN (2015b). Previously in Lutz, Sanderson
and Scherbov (2008, supplementary material), we presented forecasts of new
measures of population aging for the world and its regions without associated
probabilities. In Sanderson, Scherbov and Gerland (2017), we presented examples
of Bayesian hierarchical probabilistic forecasts of new and conventional measures
of population aging, but for four countries only: China, Germany, Iran, and the US.
2 Materials and methods
2.1 Definitions of measures of population aging
Population aging is frequently measured using changes in the proportion of the
population categorized as old and changes in the median age. The conventional
proportion of the population categorized as old is measured as the proportion
of people who are above a fixed chronological age. Here, we use age 65 as
the conventional old-age threshold. The prospective proportion of the population
categorized as old is the proportion of people with less than a fixed remaining life
expectancy. Here, we use a fixed remaining life expectancy of 15 years (Sanderson
and Scherbov 2005; Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov 2008; Sanderson and Scherbov
2010, 2013).
The conventional median age of a population is the age that divides the population
into two subgroups of equal size. The prospective median age is defined as the
age in the life table of a standard year in which people have the same remaining
life expectancy as they have at the median age of the population in the current
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year. A mathematical description of how the prospective median age is computed is
given Appendix A.1. Both the prospective proportion of the population categorized
as old and the prospective median age are specific examples of measures of aging
that take the characteristics of people into account. The general framework for the
study of characteristic-related ages has been presented in Sanderson and Scherbov
(2013, 2017). The conventional median age of the population depends solely on
the age structure of the population. Half of the people in the population are older
than the conventional median age. But it is also the case that half of the people
in the population are older than the prospective median age, when their ages are
adjusted to reflect changes in life expectancy. In Sanderson and Scherbov (2005,
2013, 2017), we have shown that when life expectancy increases, the prospective
median age could decrease even if the conventional median age has increased.
2.2 Definitions of high-income and upper middle-income countries
Future distributions of conventional and prospective median ages and the
conventional and prospective proportions of the population categorized as old
were computed from 1,000 stochastic trajectories of population age structures and
associated life tables over the 2015-2100 period for high-income countries and
upper middle-income countries, as defined by the World Bank. These trajectories
were provided by the UN’s Population Division (UN 2015b).
The high-income countries are the 89 countries and territories with the highest
levels of Gross National Income per capita in 2014, as measured by the World Bank.
In 2015, these countries accounted for 19 percent of the world’s population. The
upper middle-income countries are the 56 countries with the highest Gross National
Income per capita after the high-income countries. That group includes China and
the Russian Federation, as well as Albania, Botswana, Iraq, Mexico, Romania, and
South Africa. In 2015, these countries accounted for 33 percent of the world’s
population. The UN mortality trajectories assume that life expectancy at older ages
will generally increase throughout the century.
3 Results
3.1 Proportions of populations categorized as old
In Figure 1, we show the evolution over time of the probability distributions of
the conventional proportion of the population who are counted as old, and its
prospective analog for high-income countries. In 2015, the conventional proportion
of the population categorized as old in these countries was 16.3 percent. The median
forecast of this proportion rises to 25.8 percent in 2050, with a 90 percent prediction
interval of 25.1 to 26.6 percent. The forecasts indicate that the increase in the
conventional proportion of old people in the population will slow between 2060 and
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Figure 1:
Proportions aged 65+ and proportions with remaining life expectancy (RLE) of 15
years or less. Evolution of probability distributions of the conventional proportion of
the population counted as old and its prospective analog, World Bank high-income
countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN (2015b) and authors’ calculations.
Note: The thick line in the middle indicates the median of the distribution, and the legend to the right of the chart
indicates percentiles.
2080, and will then speed up again. By 2100, the median forecast of the proportion
of the population categorized as old is 29.4 percent, with a 90 percent prediction
interval of 27.2 to 31.6.
The median forecast of the prospective proportion of the population counted as
old is around 10.4 percent in 2015. This proportion increases to around 14.6 percent
in 2045, with a 90 percent prediction interval of 14.2 to 15.1; and is roughly stable
for the following three decades. The median forecast of this proportion is 15.1 in
2070, with a 90 percent prediction interval of 14.4 to 15.9 percent; and falls to 14.5
in 2100, with a 90 percent prediction interval of 13.3 to 15.8.
In Figure 2, we show the histograms of the dates at which the conventional and
prospective proportions of the population reach their maxima. Over 95 percent of
the stochastic trajectories of the conventional proportion of the population counted
as old peak in 2095 or beyond. In contrast, around eight percent of the stochastic
trajectories of the prospective proportion of the population counted as old peak after
2070. The conventional proportion of the population categorized as old suggests
that aging will likely continue throughout the century. In contrast, the prospective
proportion of the population categorized as old indicates that aging will likely end
well before the end of the century.
If the prospective old-age threshold was based on a remaining life expectancy of
10 years, the proportions of old people in the populations of high-income countries
would peak later, with almost all trajectories reaching a maximum by 2075. If the
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Figure 2:
Histograms of dates of reaching a maximum. Histograms of the dates at which the
conventional and the prospective proportions of populations counted as old (with
remaining life expectancy (RLE) of 15 years or less) reach their maximum, World
Bank high-income countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN (2015b) and authors’ calculations.
prospective old-age threshold was based on a remaining life expectancy of 20 years,
the maxima would be reached slightly earlier. Regardless of which prospective old-
age threshold is used, the proportion of trajectories peaking beyond 2095 in high-
income countries never exceeds one percent. We present these findings in more
detail in Appendix A.2.
In Appendix A.3, we provide the analogs to Figures 1 and 2 for upper middle-
income countries. We show that in these countries, the prospective proportions of
the population categorized as old also generally peak before the end of the century.
3.2 Median ages
In Figure 3, we show the probability distributions of the conventional and the
prospective median ages for high-income countries. We compute the prospective
median ages as the ages in the life table of 2015, in which people have the same
remaining life expectancy as at the median age in specific years (see Appendix A.1
for a mathematical exposition). The 2015 life table was interpolated on the basis of
the UN life tables for 2010–15 and 2015–20 (UN 2015b).
In 2015, the conventional and the prospective median ages were both 39.6 years.
The median forecast of the conventional median age is 44.7 for 2050, with a
90 percent prediction interval of 43.7 to 45.7; and is 47.0 in 2100, with a 90
percent prediction interval of 44.8 to 49.3. The median probabilistic forecast of the
conventional median age increases rapidly from 2015 to 2040, and the probability
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Figure 3:
Conventional and prospective median ages. Evolution of the probability distributions
of the conventional median age and its prospective analog, World Bank high-income
countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN (2015b) and authors’ calculations.
Note: The thick line in the middle indicates the median of the distribution, and the legend to the right of the chart
indicates percentiles.
that it would ever be lower than its 2015 value at any time during this century is
essentially zero. The median forecast of the prospective median age also tends to
increase between 2015 and 2040. In 2040, the median forecast of the prospective
median age is 40.7, and the 90 percent prediction interval for the prospective median
age is between 39.9 and 41.5. By 2100, the median forecast of the prospective
median age is 36.7, and the 90 percent prediction interval is between 34.3 and
39.2. On the basis of the UN’s probabilistic forecasts, it is highly unlikely that
the prospective median age of the population of the high-income countries will be
higher in 2100 than it was in 2015.
In Figure 4, we show the corresponding histograms of the years in which the
conventional and the prospective median ages reach a peak in the high-income
countries. In 89 percent of the stochastic trajectories, the peak of the conventional
median age is reached in 2095 or beyond. The increases in the conventional median
age do not suggest that population aging will come to a clear end in the high-income
group during this century. The data for the prospective median age do, however,
indicate that population aging will come to a clear end in these countries during this
century. It is expected that by 2050, over 99 percent of the stochastic trajectories of
prospective median ages will reach their peak. When measuring population aging
using the prospective median age, the end of population aging in the high-income
group is projected to be less than four decades away. It is also expected that the
prospective median age in upper middle-income countries will peak well before the
end the century. We present these findings in Appendix A.4.
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Figure 4:
Histograms of dates of reaching maximum. Histograms of the dates at which the
conventional and the prospective median ages reach their maximum, World Bank
high-income countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN (2015b) and authors’ calculations.
4 Conclusion
Changes in age structure measures in high-income and middle high-income
countries are primarily driven by changes in fertility and mortality rates. In the
long run, holding mortality and migration rates fixed, a decrease in fertility results
in faster aging because it both increases the proportion of older people in the
population and increases the population’s median age. Moreover, in the long run,
holding fertility and migration rates fixed, a decrease in mortality rates at older
ages increases both the conventional proportion of the population who are old and
the population’s median age, but it decreases the prospective proportion of the
population who are old and the population’s prospective median age (Sanderson
and Scherbov 2015).
The UN forecasts for high-income and upper middle-income countries generally
assume nearly constant or slowly rising fertility. While past fertility declines will
lead to increases in aging in the next few decades, fertility is generally forecast to
change slowly after 2015. Conventional measures of aging indicate that aging will
increase relatively rapidly in the short run because of past fertility declines, and then
more slowly due to increases in life expectancy at older ages. While prospective
measures of aging also show that aging will rise relatively rapidly in the short run
because of past decreases in fertility, these measures project that aging will decrease
in the long run due to increases in life expectancy at older ages.
In the high-income and upper middle high-income groups, some increases in the
prospective proportion of the population who are old and in the prospective median
age could occur after the middle of the century. However, almost all of the predicted
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increases in these measures will have occurred by then, as those regions are currently
experiencing their most rapid periods of population aging.
We began by asking whether high-income countries as a whole will experience a
century of population aging. When we use measures of aging that take changing
life expectancy into account, the answer is that such a scenario is unlikely, as
the application of these adjusted measures indicates that the speed of aging is
currently at its peak. We have shown that in high-income countries, the pace of
population aging will soon slow, and will very likely come to an end well before
the end of the century. This does not mean that all of the problems associated with
population aging will magically disappear. Adjusting to population aging will still
be challenging, but there is no point in exaggerating the challenge through mis-
measurement.
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Appendix
A.1 Formal definition of prospective median age
Let e(a, t) be remaining life expectancy age a in year t, and let am(t) be the median
age of the population in year t. Using the life table of year t, life expectancy at age
am(t) is e(am(t), t). It is possible to find the value of life expectancy at age am(t) in
other years as well. In year s, that life expectancy would be e(am(t), s). For example,
the median age in year t could be 40. In year t, life expectancy at age 40 could be
35. In this case, e(am(t), t) = 35. Now, we can also find life expectancy at age 40 in
another year, denoted by s. Let us suppose that life expectancy at age 40 in year s is
37 years. In this case, e(am(t), s) = 37.
The prospective median age is the age in the standard year, denoted by s, where
people have the same remaining life expectancy as at the median age in year t.
Formally, the prospective median age can be derived from the following equation:
e(pma(t, s), s) = e(am(t), t)
where pma(t, s) is the prospective median age in year t using year s as a standard.
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A.2 Sensitivity to the choice of the old-age threshold
Figure A.1:
Proportions aged 65+ and proportions with remaining life expectancy (RLE) of 10
years or less. Evolution of the probability distributions of the conventional proportion
of the population counted as old and its prospective analog, World Bank high-income
countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN World Population Prospects (UN 2015b) and authors’ calculations.
Note: The thick line in the middle indicates the median of the distribution, and the legend to the right of the chart
indicates percentiles.
Figure A.2:
Histograms of dates of reaching maximum. Histograms of the dates at which the
conventional and the prospective proportions of populations counted as old reach
(with remaining life expectancy (RLE) of 10 years or less) their maximum, World
Bank high-income countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN World Population Prospects (UN 2015b) and authors’ calculations.
Warren C. Sanderson, Sergei Scherbov and Patrick Gerland 11
Figure A.3:
Proportions aged 65+ and proportions with remaining life expectancy (RLE) of 20
years or less. Evolution of the probability distributions of the conventional proportion
of the population counted as old and its prospective analog, World Bank high-income
countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN World Population Prospects (UN 2015b) and authors’ calculations.
Note: The thick line in the middle indicates the median of the distribution, and the legend to the right of the chart
indicates percentiles.
Figure A.4:
Histograms of dates of reaching maximum. Histograms of the dates at which the
conventional and the prospective proportions of populations counted as old reach
(with remaining life expectancy of 20 years or less) their maximum, World Bank
high-income countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN World Population Prospects (UN 2015b) and authors’ calculations.
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A.3 Conventional and prospective proportions of upper
middle-income countries counted as old
Figure A.5:
Proportions aged 65+ and proportions with remaining life expectancy (RLE) of 15
years or less. Evolution of the probability distributions of the conventional proportion
of the population counted as old and its prospective analog, World Bank upper
middle-income countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN World Population Prospects (UN 2015b) and authors’ calculations.
Note: The thick line in the middle indicates the median of the distribution, and the legend to the right of the chart
indicates percentiles.
Figure A.6:
Histograms of dates of reaching maximum. Histograms of the dates at which the
conventional and the prospective proportions of populations counted as old (with
remaining life expectancy (RLE) of 15 years or less) reach their maximum, World
Bank upper middle-income countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN World Population Prospects (UN 2015b) and authors’ calculations.
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A.4 Conventional and prospective median ages of upper
middle-income countries
Figure A.7:
Conventional and prospective median ages. Evolution of the probability distributions
of the conventional median age and its prospective analog, World Bank upper
middle-income countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN World Population Prospects (UN 2015b) and authors’ calculations.
Note: The thick line in the middle indicates the median of the distribution, and the legend to the right of the chart
indicates percentiles.
Figure A.8:
Histograms of dates of reaching maximum. Histograms of the dates at which the
conventional and the prospective median ages reach their maximum, World Bank
upper middle-income countries, 2015–2100
Source: 1,000 trajectories from UN World Population Prospects (UN 2015b) and authors’ calculations.
